Archive for November, 2009

Compression Effect

Thursday, November 19th, 2009

For all the talk of restricted design and increasing complexity, it seems that what’s really happening is that restrictions are being lifted off one group and placed on another.

This happens from time to time in system-level design, usually at an inflection point in the overall system development process or at the start of a new process node. For the past couple decades, much of the creativity in semiconductor development was done at the design engineer level, often but not always in conjunction with the chip architect, while most of the heavy lifting and saving the day was done at the back end in verification and in manufacturing.

At 32nm and beyond, it’s the design engineers who are losing some freedom to say how things can be placed on a chip, what can be done to fix design flaws after the fact and what new approaches can be added. Architects now have more control over the whole SoC than ever before—and there are plenty of people who will argue the pros and cons of that for years to come—and the foundries are staking a claim from the back-end to make sure that what’s designed can be manufactured. Nobody makes money if there are yield problems or if a chip is late to market.

What’s driving this shift are too many variables on the front end and too much data on the back end. Architects have to wrestle with power budgets, power islands, business issues and marketing priorities. Foundries have to deal with massive amounts of data that get even bigger with computational scaling, and verification and debugging still have to deal with all of these issues. Costs are rising, respins can force companies to lose market windows, and complexity is forcing some choices that didn’t have to be made a couple process nodes ago. And in the midst of all of this, companies are now responsible for developing larger and larger portions of the software stack.

In between are the engineers who work at various phases of the flow, from design to layout to verification, watching what appears to be a massive shift in their market on all sides. They’re correct in sensing the changes. These are significant, and it’s too early to tell which jobs will ultimately rule the roost or at which process nodes. But whatever changes occur, you can be certain they won’t be the last.

Ed Sperling

Why Intel Is Settling With AMD

Friday, November 13th, 2009

There’s more to the Intel-AMD settlement than meets the eye.

While Intel will be paying out $1.2 billion to AMD as part of the settlement—and that’s a large chunk of money in anyone’s book—it’s a relatively small price to pay when it’s amortized over 10 years and can open the door to even bigger markets for Intel. And that’s just what this is, a down payment on the future.

Intel has been smacked by the EU ostensibly over the AMD suit. It also has been threatened by regulators in the U.S., Korea and Japan for its business tactics in the PC business. But the PC business isn’t growing by leaps and bounds anymore, and if Intel were to continue fighting in the PC world it would be endlessly sidetracked from more lucrative battles with its Atom processor and potentially its semi-custom SoC business.

Intel’s chief competitor in the Atom world is ARM. Going into battle against ARM with regulators clamping down on its business practices with its x86 processors isn’t a good thing. This doesn’t mean Intel won’t play to win in those markets. But it’s a lot easier to go after new markets without the label of a monopoly.

Intel needs AMD, if for no other reason than to act as a shield while Intel attempts to gobble up market share in the netbook and smart phone world. And it needs to be seen as just one more player in a competitive market to go after the big SoC makers. The company has almost $13 billion in cash, and these days it’s one of the very few bright spots in the semiconductor world. It has the largest R&D budget in semiconductors, its own fabs and an incredibly aggressive road map that even few ecosystems can sustain. And perhaps even more important, the company has a relentless focus on efficiency and growth that has always been part of the corporate culture.

If this were a game of chess, Intel’s payment to AMD would be like sacrificing a rook to take the opponent’s queen. And after that, it’s just a matter of gobbling up all the other pieces and keeping the king harmlessly out of trouble.

–Ed Sperling

Where Do We Go Next?

Friday, November 6th, 2009

Jim Hogan and Paul McLellan opened an interactive, thought-provoking discussion at ICCAD this week on how EDA needs to change to be successful in the year 2020.

The conclusion of this well-known duo–Hogan, the VC, and McLellan, the blogger, in their current incarnations–pointed toward optimization and software signoff, given the amount of software that is now moving into designs and the need for eking better optimization out of the individual components. They’re right on a couple of important points, which are listed below, but that still doesn’t answer the overriding question.

First of all, it’s clear that EDA isn’t commanding the value it should, given the complexity of the problems it deals with and the incredible engineering feats it provides for customers. There simply aren’t enough large customers left doing enough design starts using big enough budgets.

There are fewer design starts of bigger, more complex chips, to be sure. At 32nm and beyond, designing chips is like the application of what was learned in a theoretical physics class several years ago. When you get to designs where the insulation is measured in single digits of atoms it’s clear this stuff has gotten beyond the capabilities of many companies without development budgets that are larger than the GDP of entire countries.

It gets worse, too, when you think about validating and verifying everything from multiple states and power islands to multiple cores. This is complex stuff, and could well pass beyond the capabilities of any single company—even the largest and most prominent names—within several process nodes.

Second, software is now a key part of every design. It’s not that the software is necessarily doing anything different. It’s that there is more of it, and it all has to be integrated so it works together, as planned. You don’t want to be getting a phone call while reading your mail and have the device go dead because of an unexpected glitch in scheduling caused by yet another open window.

Because of the complications of developing software, and the sheer magnitude of the task of getting the hardware to work with the software in proper order with all the right rules, software and hardware engineering now have to come together in the same place. This is an unnatural fit, because neither of these groups speaks the same language or things the same way. But economics often forces odd combinations, and the old way of doing things in isolation no longer works.

So what becomes of an EDA company in all of this? Does it really focus on optimization? Or does it become something other than an EDA company? Our guess is both—and neither. Looking at the big guys in this market, Mentor’s approach has been to expand well beyond the core EDA flow into areas like yield and test (read yield & test, rather than two separate areas), as well as other pieces of DFM. Synopsys has done the same in areas such as standard IP and high-level synthesis. Cadence has focused on mixed signal and system in package, in addition to its core EDA market.

We’re already seeing these companies branching out into new areas, and the exploration is just beginning. They’re also continuing to invest in their cash cows. But where they’re reaching is far beyond just optimization. It’s also far beyond how we describe EDA today. What’s not clear is where exactly all of this will go, which markets will provide the best opportunities, and where the real money will be—whether it’s at the leading edge of design or enhancements at existing nodes.

The bottom line is this is still all about Moore’s Law. While it’s technically feasible, and for some companies it’s economically feasible, the number at the front end is shrinking while the number at the back end is exploding. Adding real value may be less about pushing the envelope than building an ecosystem for the mainstream developers in mass markets. It may be less about the iPhone than about the Droid, and in developing markets it may be less about either of them than communication that works all the time.

This is another kind of economic reality, and value changes from one market to the next. In these markets, one size doesn’t fit all and one solution may not solve everything. What’s good enough in China may not be the same as what’s good enough in India, which may be entirely different from what’s good enough in the United States, Europe or Japan. How do you craft a business model around that?

–Ed Sperling